[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
are five equally wrong with him who thinks they are a thousand. If
then they are not equally wrong, obviously one is less wrong and therefore
more right. If then that which has more of any quality is nearer the
norm, there must be some truth to which the more true is nearer. And
even if there is not, still there is already something better founded
and liker the truth, and we shall have got rid of the unqualified
doctrine which would prevent us from determining anything in our thought.
Part 5 "
"From the same opinion proceeds the doctrine of Protagoras, and both
doctrines must be alike true or alike untrue. For on the one hand,
if all opinions and appearances are true, all statements must be at
the same time true and false. For many men hold beliefs in which they
conflict with one another, and think those mistaken who have not the
same opinions as themselves; so that the same thing must both be and
not be. And on the other hand, if this is so, all opinions must be
true; for those who are mistaken and those who are right are opposed
to one another in their opinions; if, then, reality is such as the
view in question supposes, all will be right in their beliefs.
"Evidently, then, both doctrines proceed from the same way of thinking.
But the same method of discussion must not be used with all opponents;
for some need persuasion, and others compulsion. Those who have been
driven to this position by difficulties in their thinking can easily
Get any book for free on: www.Abika.com
METAPHYSICS 44
be cured of their ignorance; for it is not their expressed argument
but their thought that one has to meet. But those who argue for the
sake of argument can be cured only by refuting the argument as expressed
in speech and in words.
"Those who really feel the difficulties have been led to this opinion
by observation of the sensible world. (1) They think that contradictories
or contraries are true at the same time, because they see contraries
coming into existence out of the same thing. If, then, that which
is not cannot come to be, the thing must have existed before as both
contraries alike, as Anaxagoras says all is mixed in all, and Democritus
too; for he says the void and the full exist alike in every part,
and yet one of these is being, and the other non-being. To those,
then, whose belief rests on these grounds, we shall say that in a
sense they speak rightly and in a sense they err. For 'that which
is' has two meanings, so that in some sense a thing can come to be
out of that which is not, while in some sense it cannot, and the same
thing can at the same time be in being and not in being-but not in
the same respect. For the same thing can be potentially at the same
time two contraries, but it cannot actually. And again we shall ask
them to believe that among existing things there is also another kind
of substance to which neither movement nor destruction nor generation
at all belongs.
"And (2) similarly some have inferred from observation of the sensible
world the truth of appearances. For they think that the truth should
not be determined by the large or small number of those who hold a
belief, and that the same thing is thought sweet by some when they
taste it, and bitter by others, so that if all were ill or all were
mad, and only two or three were well or sane, these would be thought
ill and mad, and not the others.
"And again, they say that many of the other animals receive impressions
contrary to ours; and that even to the senses of each individual,
things do not always seem the same. Which, then, of these impressions
are true and which are false is not obvious; for the one set is no
more true than the other, but both are alike. And this is why Democritus,
at any rate, says that either there is no truth or to us at least
it is not evident.
"And in general it is because these thinkers suppose knowledge to
be sensation, and this to be a physical alteration, that they say
that what appears to our senses must be true; for it is for these
reasons that both Empedocles and Democritus and, one may almost say,
all the others have fallen victims to opinions of this sort. For Empedocles
says that when men change their condition they change their knowledge;
"
"For wisdom increases in men according to what is before them.
"
"And elsewhere he says that:- "
"So far as their nature changed, so far to them always
"Came changed thoughts into mind. "
Get any book for free on: www.Abika.com
METAPHYSICS 45
"And Parmenides also expresses himself in the same way: "
"For as at each time the much-bent limbs are composed,
[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]